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Introduction
Something very intriguing about the use of 
language is the fact that thoughts in the 
speaker's mind are converted into a sequence 
of symbols and the sequence of symbols 
received by the receiver's sense organs are 
converted back into thoughts. Although this 
phenomenon may be hard to understand, it is 
presumably not a mystery. Sufficient 
research into the neurophysiology of 
language should uncover the mechanisms 
that underlie these processes of encoding 
and decoding. However, here I will try to 
give a social-psychological description of 
the nature of this relationship and offer a 
criticism of an influential contemporary 
approach, mentalism (Berwick and 
Chomsky, 2016) to understanding language 
and mind. 
In this paper, I would like to ask how these 
systems relate to communication. In the 
context of communication, it is important 
for a listener to get a rough idea of what the 
speaker has in mind. The direction I take 
will be along the following lines. Firstly, I 
will provide a description for this essential 
component of linguistic communication, 
namely explicate what I mean by 
understanding other minds. Then I will 
discuss the idea of narratives to show how 
propositional thought is less explanatory 
than narratives in understanding the act of 
communication. I will illustrate this point 
through a brief examination of a highly 
effective work of fiction (Achebe, 1995), 
which may also be read as a work of 
translation. I will further suggest that the 
requirement of formalism—so essential to 
“internalist” approaches—poses a problem 
when we try to build up a picture of 
language and thought. This will be 
followed by a conclusion which includes a 
brief look at how this view of the 
relationship between language and thought 
bears on language teaching. 
Understanding Other Minds 
The theoretical approach of generative 
grammar proposed and developed by Noam 
Chomsky and his followers over the last sixty 
years makes certain assumptions regarding 
the connection between language and 
thought. A major assumption underlying this 
approach is that language is a property of the 
human mind and hence, it is a window into 
thought. This relationship between language 
and an individual human being's thought 
makes this mode of inquiry an internalist 
one. Further, as part of this internalist 
inquiry, formal descriptions need to be 
provided for the structures of linguistic units 
such as phrases and sentences.
According to recent formulations of 
generative grammar, a single operation is 
sufficient for building the syntactic 
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structure of human language. This 
operation is called “Merge”. “Merge”is 
defined as the operation that “takes any two 
syntactic elements and combines them into 
a new, larger hierarchically structured 
expression” (Berwick & Chomsky, 2016, 
p. 10). Basic formal semantics posits that 
the meaning of linguistic expressions gets 
formed incrementally as the syntactic 
structure gets built up, a principle known as 
compositionality. The unit of meaning 
corresponding to a sentence is a 
proposition, whose truth-value can be 
determined.  This picture is more or less 
compatible with the philosophy underlying 
generative grammar, according to which 
linguistic structures correspond to units of 
thought. The correspondence between 
language and thought implies that the basic 
syntactic operation of “merge”is ultimately 
a property of thought. However, a major 
shortcoming of this view of linguistic 
meaning based on such a formal and 
internalist approach is that it is agnostic 
about how one person understands 
another's thoughts in the context of 
communication. There has to be something 
above and beyond compositionality that 
contributes to meaning, and beyond the 
factors having to do with a shared context; 
this has to do with understanding what the 
speaker has in mind. 
For language to work in contexts of 
communication, it is important for the 
participants to have common meanings for 
linguistic expressions. This arises, according 
to Chomsky and Berwick (2016), from 
“shared cognoscitive powers” that lets 
human beings form common “mental 
constructs”, “presuppositions”, and so on 
(p. 86). Imagine a simple communicative 
context consisting of two individuals X and 
Y. When X uses an expression not known to 
Y, then Y has to either guess its meaning 
from the context, or find out from X or look 
up a dictionary. In any case, for 
communication to happen, it is important 
for Y to have a working sense of what X has 
in mind. 
In other words, the idea of “shared 
cognoscitive powers” is not very clear. If 
the cognitive content (mental constructs, 
propositions, etc.) associated with a word is 
a purely individual matter, how is it that 
two or more individuals come to share the 
same content with respect to a word?  
David Bleich (1988), offers an answer to 
this question when he takes a detailed look 
at the idea that language is fundamentally 
social. When two individuals are involved 
in an act of communication, according to 
Bleich, they acknowledge that they matter 
to each other and have a responsibility to 
understand and to be intelligible to each 
other (p. 67). If social relationship is 
inseparable from linguistic communication, 
having a shared cognitive content for an 
expression would be a simple consequence. 
However, studies in pragmatics have made 
it clear that there is more to meaning than 
compositionality or the parallelism 
between syntax and semantics. Beyond 
pragmatic principles such as implicatures, I 
would like to propose that there is a 
narrative component to meaning. This does 
not obviate the idea that propositions are 
units of thought and as a result, are integral 
to how we understand language. Instead, it 
supplements that view by focusing on 
Bleich's point that meaning-making is a 
reciprocal and dynamic activity based on 
social relationships (Bleich, 1988). Thus, 
48 Language and Language Teaching             Volume 6 Number 2 Issue 12        July 2017
meaning arises out of narratives shared by 
participants in a conversation. I will  
illustrate this point with the help of parables 
and myths shared by a community, as 
depicted in a work of fiction. 
Narratives and Thought 
There are many interesting examples of 
non-propositional thought in Chinua 
Achebe's novel Things Fall Apart (1958), 
which was written in English and which 
deals with what happened to the land, 
culture and livelihood of the Igbo 
community in Nigeria just before and 
during the early days of western 
colonization. An important component of 
the characters' communication are the stories 
known by most members of the community 
and explanations of truths about life. 
Interestingly, many of the stories involve 
animals. Such stories and explanations are 
important to the way in which members of 
the community think about and understand 
their world. Translating such thoughts to 
propositions might be missing an important 
point about how human beings think. This 
can be exemplified using two examples. 
The first one is a description of stories that 
Nwoye, one of the children in the novel, 
hears from his parents:
So Okonkwo encouraged the boys to 
sit with him in his obi, and he told them 
stories of the land—masculine stories 
of violence and bloodshed. Nwoye 
knew that it was right to be masculine 
and to be violent, but somehow he still 
preferred the stories that his mother 
used to tell, and which she no doubt 
still told to her younger children— 
stories of the tortoise and his wily 
ways, and of the bird eneke-nti-oba 
who challenged the whole world to a 
wrestling contest and was finally 
thrown by the cat. He remembered the 
story she often told of the quarrel 
between Earth and Sky long ago, and 
how Sky withheld rain for seven years, 
until crops withered and the dead could 
not be buried because the hoes broke 
on the stony Earth. At last Vulture was 
sent to plead with Sky, and to soften his 
heart with a song of the suffering of the 
sons of men. Whenever Nwoye's 
mother sang this song he felt carried 
away to the distant scene in the sky 
where Vulture, Earth's emissary, sang 
for mercy. At last Sky was moved to 
pity, and he gave to Vulture rain 
wrapped in leaves of coco-yam. But as 
he flew home his long talon pierced the 
leaves and the rain fell as it had never 
fallen before. And so heavily did it rain 
on Vulture that he did not return to 
deliver his message but flew to a 
distant land, from where he had espied 
a fire. And when he got there he found 
it was a man making a sacrifice. He 
warmed himself in the fire and ate the 
entrails. (p. 17)
Notice that the story told by Nwoye's 
mother shows deep emotional content and 
a world view that shows close connections 
between human and non-human nature. 
Stories like this suggest that thoughts relate 
to imaginative accounts and descriptions 
that help people understand the world 
around them. I would agree with the view 
that language is a window into thought, but 
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I disagree with the view that meaning is 
computed by determining truth-values of 
propositions, which seems to me to be a 
result of a formalistic requirement. The 
interesting fact is that the members of a 
community share thoughts that result from 
the common stories and myths that formed 
their world view. 
The second story has to do with convincing 
the main character, who is ordered to move 
to his mother's land for a few years as a 
punishment for a crime he had committed. 
The excerpt given here is the advice given 
by a male elder of his mother's family:
Why is Okonkwo with us today? This 
is not his clan. We are only his mother's 
kinsmen. He does not belong here. He 
is an exile, condemned for seven years 
to live in a strange land. And so he is 
bowed with grief. But there is just one 
question I would like to ask him. Can 
you tell me, Okonkwo, why it is that 
one of the commonest names we give 
our children is Nneka, or "Mother is 
Supreme?" We all know that a man is 
the head of the family and his wives do 
his bidding. A child belongs to its 
father and his family and not to its 
mother and her family. A man belongs 
to his fatherland and not to his 
motherland. And yet we say Nneka 
–'Mother is Supreme.' Why is that? 
(p.44)
These two passages, about the relationship 
between human and non-human nature on 
the one hand and human relationships on 
the other, respectively show that the 
members of the community share 
narratives that form an important part of 
their thinking. Notice that anybody can 
understand how these shared narratives 
within a community contribute to the way 
they think. So it is important to attend to the 
fact that the point of these examples is not 
to suggest linguistic relativism, according 
to which features of particular languages 
shape the way the world is viewed and 
understood (Whorf, 1956, p.213). 
However, I do want to indicate that the 
conception of thoughts as propositions 
with truth-values might arise from a very 
specific world view based on verification 
of linguistic statements. 
Apart from the fact that literature is also a 
type of communication, there is another 
reason why literary texts are ideal for 
illustrating a view of language which gives 
emphasis on narratives. A process similar 
to the encoding and decoding described at 
the outset seems to be at work when we, as 
readers, are deeply affected by literature. 
Readers often remark how deeply they are 
moved by certain works of fiction and 
poetry. Formally, this emotional-aesthetic 
effect must have a component that works 
by compositionality, for the desired effect 
is produced by the combination of 
linguistic units. (An interesting discussion 
of the aesthetic effect of literary work 
occurs in Pollock (2010)). The similarity in 
the nature of this effect to meaning 
stretches beyond compositionality to 
understanding the author's mind, which 
includes the affective devices the author 
has used. 
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Translation
The act of translation is not a mere act of 
translating words and following the 
grammatical rules of the target language. 
Unless the translator has a sense of the 
culture and myths of the source language, 
the translation will be inadequate. Given 
that Chinua Achebe is an Igbo speaker who 
chose to write in English, it is possible to 
imagine Things Fall Apart as a work of 
translation. The author's deep understanding 
of the source language and culture would 
explain the power of the novel. Although not 
narrated in the language of the region in 
which the novel is set and in which the 
conversations in the novel could plausibly 
have taken place, the novel is successful in 
communicating the shared stories that 
are unique to that culture and offer 
entertainment and wisdom to its members. 
The effective transmission of culturally 
specific stories in Things Fall Apart 
illustrates an aspect of translation that goes 
beyond the mechanical acts of finding 
roughly equivalent words in the target 
language and applying the grammatical 
rules. I wish to point out that the idea of a 
deep cultural sensibility is applicable to 
normal linguistic communication just as it is 
to the domain of translation. 
Conclusion 
The key idea in this paper that dealt with a 
spectrum of concepts such as grammar, 
meaning, truth-values, fiction and 
translation was the importance of narratives 
with respect to the mapping between 
language and thought. This is a fact that is 
not sufficiently appreciated by linguists of 
an internalist orientation. Taking a step 
further, one might suggest that the reason 
why fiction is an effective tool for language 
teaching is a result of this. Further, 
narratives take on a special prominence 
because of the fact that human beings use 
language as a mediator between the outer 
world and the inner domain of ideas. A 
special focus on narratives with respect to 
language helps us understand the ways in 
which we relate to the world, as illustrated 
by the passages from Things Fall Apart. 
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